Proportional Representation in the Austr | Australian Political Analysis Review

Proportional Representation in the Australian Federal Parliament

It is a reality that multi-party systems emerge from two-party systems.

Article by Jasper Wiggins

Image: Parliament of Australia

Let’s Reform our Electoral System: Should Australia Adopt PR?

Australian Political Analysis Review - Open Source Independent Education

It is a reality that multi-party systems emerge from two-party systems. So why hasn’t a case for full proportional representation emerged in the Australian House of Representatives yet? If parties ought to reflect the daily grievances of Australians, Labor and the Coalition have fallen short and have to some extent resembled each other increasingly similarly on key policy areas. In my view, the two-party plurality system has embedded electoral inertia systematically against minor parties and rendered their prospects for office hardly obtainable in the House of Representatives. This is by and large, a deliberate choice by the two major parties to maintain power at the cost of a meaningful vote without considering the following implications.

A Case for Representation

The proportional representative model of Europe reflects aspiration for direct democracy by and on behalf of the people over its delegation. Structurally, voters carry greater weight in their votes for multiple candidates who are weighted against each other in the contest for multiple seats within electorates. At first instance, this mechanically offers a direct reflection of the constituency, for a broader and popular cross-section of the constituency is reflected. The plurality first-past-the-post (FPTP) single-member district model critiques multi-consensus electorates as a single margin of 50% is to be crossed by a single candidate who takes all, even if the second-best candidate obtained a 30% share of the vote. For the latter, this translates to zero seats, whereas the sucessful candidate takes the entire vote share. This logic has always produced large seat-shares and comfortable majorities for both major parties in the Australian House of Representatives.

Moreover, FPTP discourages smaller parties who are already structurally at the disadvantage. Only through tactical voting in electorates or through compromises with larger parties, can smaller ones succeed. For political scientists, Duverger’s Law characterises this phenomenon as a corresponding ‘input ratio’ of votes translated into seats on the grounds of the quantity of seats they obtain from the electorate. Voters are theorised to psychologically favour larger parties because they naturally share a greater prospect of winning, thus little incentive exists in the first place to challenge the incumbent. The two-party system disincentivises election-influencing parties as which inhibits the democratic process as competition is reduced. If elections in the House of Representatives are reduced to policy-bargaining between Labour and the Coalition, then the available preferences of voters can be observed as restricted according to these twofold consequences by Duverger.

Anthony Down’s paradox of voting summarises this logic well. If the voting outcome is dependent on the probability of an election winning vote (p) multiplied by the benefit of voting minus the differential benefit of another candidate triumphing over your own (B), minus the cost of physically casting a ballot (C), then a system of proportional representation alleviates the risk benefit of casting a weaker ballot to achieve neither a candidate if a voters preference, nor their triumph over any possible candidate. In a PR system a spread of successful votes is of greater magnitude, whereby the cost of a voted candidate losing to another one is lower because the threshold a candidate must reach is lower and the sum of available seats greater without the need for tactical or strategic entry of candidates to overcome electoral laws. Down’s equation is paradoxical because voting remains a limited activity of little

V = pB – C

Offsetting Polarisation

The most recent European election results have indicated a gradual shift to the Right. Although this came at the expense of the Centre-Left, von der Leyen's incumbent leading European People's Party emerged victorious. Despite losing the greatest increase in vote share, the EPP took the edge over the latter due to their internal division over key policies. Right-wing parties do not become as necessarily polarised, as their specific voter base remains constantly in touch with the composite centre, while coalition diplomacy remain requisite for government. Even moreso, the European Parliament requires parties to form working groups as such to qualify as an official party and voting bloc. Whereas, the United States has since reached high levels of polarisation between the Republicans and Democrats. Both parties have elevated candidate-based over party-based campaigns directed at unifying their majoritarian and often 'big-tent' blocs to prevent in-fighting and to convey strength.

According to economist and theorist Anthony Downs, the relationship between the voter and the electoral system only contributes to tension and higher levels of disagreement until a multi-party system emerges. Ultimately, one can observe the quality and need for dynamic inter-party logic which in his view is inevitable in two-party systems. Downs argues to overcome the threat of polarisation suggests FPTP-induced grievances may inhibit the democratic process in extreme instances, whereby the political ground should be tempered from the centre through the emergence of a multi-party PR model. For Down’s this situation is corrected either through electoral reform by the incumbent, or a popular rejection of the system. Whereas flexible pacts and agreements between parties offer more representative avenues for government as greater voter-input per cast vote can be satisfied through multi-party coalition processes as opposed to the confines of a two-party legislature in which smaller parties offer little to no bargaining power. The present composition of the legislature of the United Kingdom may also be emblematic of this phenomenon in its fissure of the two-party dynamic, however it is possible that their disenfranchise with plurality is temporary and rather a consequence of mass tactical voting despite the performance by Reform UK.

As proportional representation increases the share of political offices in elections, coalitions assert greater function in bridging parties on policy. They are dynamic because key stakeholders can withdraw from the pact and form partnerships at this discretion. On first instance, extremist views purported by radical politicians may be neutralised because the reality of power-sharing dilutes their agenda with multiple other parties which they form a coalition with, who will tend to share fewer radical views toward policy areas. Secondly, these are not features rejected in two-party systems although often are exercised to a lesser extent. Whereas majoritarianism in a two-party overcomes falls short addressing the reality of two polarised strands of political sentiments, while reducing scope of representation per seat, to one of either major party.

A Flexible Mandate Encouraging Cross-Party Negotiation

With the long-term in mind, the proportional representative model in a multi-party system is healthier for democracy as the mandate a large party or coalition may exercise is often temporary. This is because membership is held to the discretion of both voters and party members, making it more accountable than a successful majoritarian party that controls the mandate as it can end at any moment suggesting that power is not static and proportional to the extent of representativeness of any given party which is relative to their magnitude in seats. A moderate and more representative consensus will almost always be secured in proportional representative systems by the will of voters. This is evident in the enduring power sharing agreement between the EPP and the Centre-Left, parties that overcame infighting from both the Right and Left to secure their mandate. Whereas if the Right for instance were to unite, von der Leyen would stand little chance against Orbán, Meloni and Le Pen’s combined right-wing coalition.

At the same time this mandate remains concurrently secure as the higher required threshold for it prevents the rapid reversal of policy observed in some elections in two-party systems. This would insulate the state with greater assurances to rely on in inter-country matter with particularly when involving trade and defence. In two-party systems, the distribution of power is zero-sum and sparingly shared unless government is formed in the minority, legislator’s cross party-lines or if temporary pacts are formed, which in these circumstances, does not meet the definition of holding the mandate. Policy in other words can be radically abrogated at the lowest possible mandate of 51% alluding to ideas of consequences by Alexander Du Tocqueville’s tyranny by majority. Capacity for instability has been increasingly apparent in contemporary US politics, which further speculates on prospects for violence or worse, a rejection of the political order when the mandate is more or less unrepresentative and delegated to a legislative system rather than of the people.

Conclusion

The proportional representative approach in the Commonwealth House of Representatives would share a twofold benefit. With the increased nature of inter-party factionalism and disagreement is the reality of greater person per electorate representation for their views. In turn, political franchises by smaller parties can be incentivised and thus yield meaningful results by and large. Perhaps in the longer term, a proportional representative system can seek to refute the increasingly bi-partisan semblance of Labor and the Coalition through representative electoral results that are proportional to per voter input and security of legislative mandates.

Jasper Wiggins

13/07/2024