The tolerance of corruption in the Roman Republic was a result of the aristocratic predisposition to public office. Lintott argues that in a moral sense, socialisation of “election bribery”, incentivised by “ambitus” a sense of ambition to seek prestige and glory for family, which normalised ultra-competitiveness. Cicero furthers this notion, citing that Sulla normalised accepted “ruthless behaviour”, such as conviction without trial, exacerbated the elites’ already lack accountability, however lawfully empowered by Valerian Law. Stout advances Cicero’s notion, further characterising the rotation of consulship between Marius and Sulla as something transactional by implication of power struggle, further deteriorating the notion of normalised corruption, for only when business spoiled between the two, was legal immunity reneged on Sulla. 

While Cicero’s assertions hold merit, it should however be recognised that politics largely for Cicero, as it was for all senators, a professional career. Thus, his reservations against Sulla and Marius’ power dynamic are largely contradictory, for Cicero himself supported Sulla’s proscriptions in exchange reform. Cicero even goes to an extent to defend charges of incitement and extortion against Sulla, citing that his actions were conducive to the best interests of the state while contrasting these with his Sulla’s known sinister traits (Cicero, Pro Sulla, 21-23). The extent of Cicero’s defence appears to be substantial, for his intentions seek to cast doubt over the validity of each charge. Plutarch whereas, discredits Cicero, advancing that he contributed to corrupt dealings in the Senate, for policy he pursued as Consul, warranted appeasement to Pompey and Crassus. (Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, 311). He further notes that Cicero vested public funds into the armies of the already influential Crassus to quell the Cattellian opposition, thus concurrently adding to the former’s material strength, to save his Consulship (Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, 325). Cicero’s hypocrisy juxtaposed with predisposed ego, underscores the contradictory personalities that comprised of the Republic’s Senate. Inference, moreover, suggest that such a combination of attitudes rendered the Senate’s function compromised, and thereby, vulnerable to the accession of military strongmen such as Julius Caesar.

On one hand, Philip Styrt defines the stunts performed by Caesar in 61 BC, as transactions of “continual faction,” similarly modelled after the shared power dynamic of  Crassus and Pompey. Recurrent factionalism in Styrt’s view facilitated by “interplay” of business deals between “friends”, permanently orientated Senate agenda around the discrediting of opposing faction, and thus debilitating the Senates’ legislative function. To a large extent, this rendered it subject to the business of private alliances, who would utilise “cooperation” as means of holding mandate over consul appointments, and thereby Senate veto. Further, Robert Bronner adds that factionalism between alliances, compelled both Caesar and Pompey to “stack the magestry’s” with loyalist enablers who would utilise majority voting blocs to support triumvir bidding though legal legislative means. Subsequently, the Senate became the “staging ground” for Caesar’s dictatorship.

On the contrary, the function of the triumvirate between Octavian, Antony and Lepidus served more as a vulnerable tool to justify collective dictatorship as opposed to a legislative bargaining chip. Robert Bonner, moreover, evaluates that the less binding “gentlemen’s agreement” between Pompey, Crassus and Caesar of the First Triumvirate had evolved, in the Second, as something rather empowered by Lex Titia, or enforceable “legal creation.”  Bonner adds that through subjection of the legislature did it render tripartite governance, as effective “dictatorship in commission.” Exceptional powers vested in Octavian, Antony and Lepidus subsisted, implying, that the Senate was compelled to ratify increasingly autocratic powers for free nomination of magistrates, sanction “without appeal” or trial, out of implicit fear of political persecution. Unlike Julius Caesar, the triumvirate’s revised function enabled the triumvirs “to step into power” due to mutual recognition of the collective strength, suggesting the fallacy that they had learnt from Caesar’s mistakes. Contrary to modern Elitist Theory, the weaponization of the triumvirate mechanism rendered self-destructive outcomes for the welfare of the Republic. By implication, the weakened function of the Senate was subject to the will of military strongmen who pledged to restore what they had already taken.