Westphalian sovereignty is understood as a normative and explanatory approach to state power and legitimacy, considering non-interference as the governing distinction between the domestic state and the international system (Lake, 2009, pg.44, 53). Westphalian sovereignty entitled a state to exclusive sovereignty over its territory. This principle was influenced by Thomas Hobbes’ (1901) ‘Levithan’ analogy, conceiving sovereignty as constituting social contract (pg.95). For realists, monopoly over violence was necessary to enforce civil society, whereas liberals also converged, assuming this as conducive to the civil institutions to promote cooperation as a form of protection distinguished from nature (Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2016, 174-75 & 120-21). 

On the contrary, Weberian sovereignty considered a state’s monopoly on violence as problematic to state power if it compromised its citizens rights, suggesting that infringements could de-legitimise sovereignty. Hobson (2000) also critiqued Westphalian sovereignty as causing a rift between ‘state-central’ domestic agential power and ‘non-state’ actors, inferring a responsibility for international intervention (pg.4). This was materialised in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles governing sovereignty as the right the protection of citizens without violence. Consequently, for Marxists and Liberals, Weberian sovereignty should be viewed as the reflection of social forces rather than state as a neorealist body pursuing its interests over individual or collective rights (Cox, 1981, pg.138-40).