Madison recognised that the threat of constant conflict posed by delegatory models would serve inconveniently to the size and scope of big government. Thus, his understanding of limited representation as loaned trusteeship concerning legislative office sought to reduce conflict to electoral periods. In doing so, constituent views deriving from each of the three “sectors” of “smaller republics”: local, state, and federal would thereby pass “through a medium” characterised by the character of the legislator for that electorate, in the transmission of a view, idea or grievance to Congress. 

On the contrary, Kevin Arceneaux contends that the issue of “complexity”, particularly among people with “low levels of political knowledge” assumes citizens are “capable” of distinguishing political orders. Thus, the consequence subsisting is one of the mass election of legislators to a large sum of posts. Arceneaux’s primary concern relates as to how rational citizens assign their values, beliefs and grievances to candidates elected on mass. Thus, must not only the individual discern which jurisdiction their grievance falls under, but also locate the best-suited candidate eligible and willing to carry a policy to election without inference as to how such policy will be “implemented.” For example, a citizen from California with a grievance toward the upkeep of local national parks will need to differentiate between electing on the State or Federal law-making jurisdiction to either the eight-eight seat Californian State Assembly, or one of the fifty-two Congressional representatives per district.; 

Moreover, Arceneaux’s point further scrutinises Alexander Hamilton, who juxtaposes the people’s electoral power as the only “rival to power” of the Central Government. While this notion enshrines the voter’s centrality as a part of electoral mechanism, this assumption however is ignorant to procedural complexity, for a confused voter contradicts any source of viable rivalry posed to the Government. To some extent, perhaps such a framework acts conductively to the political elite for lack of certainty in the political process almost always perpetuates a status-quo mentality. Furthermore, Saul Cornell notes that Washington’s successor, Adams was sympathetic to Jefferson’s term “natural aristocracy,” transposing the concept of virtue from talent to merit, during the Constitutional Convention. While it should be recognised that Adams was aware natural aristocracy could decay into the elitist “artificial” aristocratic pollical class, Saul suggests that Federalists “exploited” the “ambiguous” definition by arguing that “republicanism required” naturally “virtuous” leaders. This theory can be observed to be largely hypocritical, for all ministers in Washington’s first Cabinet were all of the same elite class, implying that merit was attainable with wealth.

Nevertheless, Anti-Federalist literature by Thomas Paine further calls into question the issue of legislator’s detachment from their constituency concerning their capacity to represent. Paine’s chief concern was in relation to the significant discretion of lawmakers. If legislators remained detached and therefore insulated from pressures by constituents, there was a chance they would rather act in their own interests upon election. Thus, the quasi-deliberationaloist means of “regular interval” posited by Paine’s Common-Sense pamphlet, favours the mechanism of “regular elections” designed to penetrate the autonomy of legislators, for the people could vote out lawmakers deemed ineffective on greater basis. Madison by contrast, argues the notion of “greater aggregate” (diversity) over constituent views, empowered by trusteeship, rather enables popular voice to be “consonant” or widely appealing to all voters, to perhaps mitigate constant grievances. Paine however, refutes this assertion, arguing that fear of re-election operates more effectively as a check than a moral responsibility owed to the people by leaders as suggested by Edmund Burke, for such a necessity in Paine’s view exists as “matter of right”, rather than non-binding moral thought.;

Lastly, Penniman recognises that Paine’s’ view towards the structural overlaps between the Executive and Judicial branches contradicts the doctrine of the separation of powers. Paine compares the function of a judiciary, citing that in a monarchy “judges may protect the people” whereas in a democracy, they are (by fault of the legislature) “a limitation” on people’s right to “self-government.” This, subsequently, is a product of the legislature’s role in appointing and thereafter, influencing the composition of politicised judicial benches.