Liberal Institutionalism and Hegemony
International organisations preference the interests of those who constitute and finance its foundations.
Disclaimer: Marxist/Post-Marxist frameworks used do not represent personal views and instead are used for analysis
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Image: International Monetary Fund
Determining the Rules of the Game: Liberal Institutionalism and Hegemony in
International Peace-Making
Subscription to Hegemony from a Critical Realist Perspective: Power and Conflict of
Interests
Australian Political Analysis Review - Open Source Independent Education
If hegemony imposes its values on the liberal international order, then the jurisdiction and
function of international organisations ought be recognised as subsidiary. From the outset, the
interconnectedness between the hegemon and international organisation (IO) suggests that
institutional autonomy will often be implicitly limited when policy is contrary to the
hegemon’s interests. Nonetheless, the role of superpowers in liberal institutionalism renders
peace subjective if the rules of the game are revised to the will of the hegemon. On the other
hand, it would be a mistake to discount the deliberative and socialising role of IOs and
INGOs, however not without internal issues implicating hegemonic stability. Finally, post-
Marxist critiques highlight the role of international organisations in development and peace-
making may assert more harm than good in the global South. Ultimately, the neoliberal order
spearheaded by the United States suggests that peace to a great extent, is subjective and at the
discretion of hegemony. The jurisdiction of international organisations thus operates relative
to hegemonic interests and therefore may promote peace as a façade to zero-sum competition. Consequently, the effectiveness of liberalism’s cooperation enforcement depends upon
consolidation of unipolarity which is characteristic of empire even when diffused
institutionally by liberal economic, legal and social norms.
International organisations preference the interests of those who constitute its foundations.
For Robert Giplin (1987), liberal international organisations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) act as an apparatus “through which” the United States presses its
economic agenda (p. 46). Barrnett and Duvall (2005) attribute to the centrality of the US
dollar and to power in its institutional form, whereby dominance of the US is diffused
through institutional arrangements internal to the IMF including influence over financial
markets and exchange rates (pg. 45, 47 and 51). Whereas approaches to structural power
scrutinise the institutional arrangements internal to INGOs. For Barnett and Finnemore
(1999), deconstructing liberal institutionalism reveals that the Keynesian neoliberal logic has
been advanced without little resistance due to its co-constitutive and structural post-war
placement at Bretton Woods.
For Antonio Gramsci, structure rather reflects the recognition of “constitutive arrangements”
or superstructures that predetermine relationships between states and IOs (Murphy, 1998, pg.
423), (Cox, 1981, pg. 134). In this sense, the composition of the IMF’s Executive Board of
Governors is structurally privileged against non-Western countries suggesting a degree of
complicity by or on behalf of the discretion of the United States. This reality is evidenced
with the placement of China at 306,288 votes, fewer than the combined total of the US,
Japan, the United Kingdom and France totalling to 1,549,500 (International Monetary Fund,
2024). This figure is more than four times the share of China as the second largest economy
and largest exporter inferring that liberal cooperation disproportionality skewed toward the
West. More significantly, intergovernmental bodies such as the IMF wield the institutional
power to enforce international monetary policy applied to all state actors. This assumes
punitive consequences to non-conformist or disadvantaged economies unable to structurally
adjust to neoliberal market capitalism. For instance, erroneous monetary loans by the IMF
have contributed to civil disorder, antithetical to norms of peace and civil order, in states like
Bangladesh which defaulted in 2023 and 2024 (Kumar, 2011, 61-69), (Kapur, 1998, 118).
This concludes that IOs often act as the tools of hegemony while offering the collaborative
benefit of institutionalism to developed economies while peace-making objectives remain
short-term and performative.
Nevertheless, the entrenchment of Keynesian economics in IOs observes the socialisation
adverse monetary norms compatible internationally with the US. Neoliberalism has
contributed to the normalisation of large pools of debt both on a national and individual basis.
Between 2004 and 2022, the New York Federal Reserve warranted that the sum of household
debt had doubled from $6.17 to $11.9 trillion dollars irrespective of party in office (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 2024). On the contrary, these implications have had significantly
dire effects in the global South. For S. R. Osmani (2017), the introduction of microcredit has
acted as a “debt-trap” to encourage the withdrawal of concurrent loans in Bangladesh by US
corporations and INGOs. Osmani attributes the ramifications of the scheme to lenders
authorising unpayable loans abroad. He advances that while monetary policy can aspire to
eliminate poverty, its gendered consequences against women and lack of enforcement were
not unforeseeable (pg. 72). Rather structural adjustment and the interests of elites
contradicted the humanitarian justification for microcredit in the first place.
The Subjectivity of Peace and the Role of Superpowers
It would be erroneous to assume that the capacity to defy the international community and its
institutions by superpowers has little ramifications on peace-making efforts. With this
understanding, it must be understood that peace is also subjective and to the discretion of
hegemony. Significantly, peace-enforcing policy may authorise foreign intervention into a
sovereign state while turning a blind eye to security competition exercised through soft power
such as monetary policy or protectionism. For Ramesh Thakur (2011) the redefinition of
Westphalian sovereignty through Responsibility to Protect (R2P) positioned sovereignty as
being localised in the protection of citizens against infringing governments (pg. 13).
Nonetheless, Justin Morriss (2013) refutes that power to dissolve a state’s legitimacy based
on R2P principles did not reside within the international community, but rather
contradictorily to the discretion of the US (pg. 1267). Concurrently, use of force against
Libya was premised primarily on pillar 1/3 (protect the citizens) implying that it was
incomplete (pg. 1272). This concludes that justification for Libya’s dissolution of sovereignty
had been only partially addressed through R2P’s overt citation which challenges the UN as
lacking the mandate and material capacity in contrast to the US. For Christina Budescu and
Thomas Weiss (2010), the United States’ unauthorised invasion of Iraq on NATO’s “pre-
emptive self-defence” also reflected a violation of international law and the rejection of R2P.
NATO’s justification not only can be interpreted as sovereign only to domestic US foreign
policy, but also reduced the capacity of the UNSC to arbitrate binding resolutions pursuant to
R2P and Article 51. This acceded the UNSC’s capacity to enforce peace to superpower or
great-power state actors and can also be reflected in the UNSC’s inconsequential approach to
the Russo-Ukrainian War. This concluded the use of force is disproportionately dependent on
superpower material resources (NATO or domestic), suggesting that the primacy of state hard
law triumphs soft law of international organisations.
Finally, the consideration of peace as exclusively involving armed conflict fails to consider its
wider and sometimes more ambiguous economic and normative scope. For realist John
Mearsheimer (1994), cooperation enforcement as a replacement to anarchy raises the stakes
of non-compliance, and therefore conflict. The threat of war by non-complying actors such as
terror organisations or non-complying states like North Korea incentivise conflict for liberal
institutionalism as integration into the international order is requisite for collective security
(pg. 11, 16, 17 and 20). This may be counter-intuitive to co-existence if compliance is
enforced through embargos, foreign interference and protectionism which may cause
diplomatic grievances, coups or internal disorder as Cuba evidenced during the 1950s
(Morley, 1982, 166-170).
The Merit and Troubles of Liberal Institutionalism: IOs and Hegemonic Stability
Theory
International and intergovernmental organisations have enshrined to liberalism as a
universalist economic and political doctrine; however, this is not without internal issues. For
John and Francis Orneal (1996), economic interdependence has facilitated a peace between
trading partner states, realising Kant’s “peace of nations.” In this sense, business can be
considered more profitable than war (pg. 13). Indeed, global forums and transnational actors
like the Association of Southeast Asian Partners facilitate coordination between economic
actors through multilateral dialogue and provide a space to resolve differences while fostering
mutual interdependence. Liberal universalism has thus demonstrated a constructive effect in
peace-making as hot wars since 1991 have been relatively localised at the expense of
unipolarity (Imperial War Museums, 2024). Whereas normative values of liberalism have
been socialised by IO’s to the extent that they have been insulated from abrogation in
domestic legislatures of states. Their promotion as social imperatives by IGOs and NGOs
underscore that IO’s contribute significantly to their safekeeping and assure continuity in the
long-term for coordination (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, 15-16). For example, after Trump’s
presidency, Biden rejoined the Paris Accords, signifying an advance back into the
international.
On the contrary, Barrnett and Fennimore’s classification of the pathologies of international
organisations considers the role NGOs internally as limited in implementing norms.
According to Robert Keohane’s observations, IO’s socialise norms not because they “are
strong” and have the jurisdiction, but because they lack it (Barrnett and Fennimore, 1999, pg.
717). This explains why NGOs depend on charity, although INGO’s differ. States remain
central to the equation for the latter, relying on the legal domestic authority of states to fund
policy. If financing is requisite for agenda, then INGOs will prioritise it like any other
corporation. Critiquing Keohane, John Mearsheimer (1994) argues that liberal institutions
maximise collective good, thereby raising the cost of realist state self-help with sanctions (pg.
24 and 27). If Mearsheimer is correct, then policy guided by liberal institutionalism will
result in conflict in order to have its way. Naomi Klehin (2007) reinforces this, citing that
“shock doctrine” by the US in post-Soviet states including Russia, instigated economic crisis
after the IMF refused to honour debt afforded after dissolution in 1991 (pg. 219). Klehin
attributes hostile “disaster capitalism” to the consolidation of unipolarity by inhibiting
Russia’s economic recovery, indicative of zero-sum behaviour.
Finally, critics of Hegemonic Stability Theory allege that international organisations
contribute to hegemonic decline. This is because, unlike national governments, INGOs and
NGOs are undemocratic bureaucracies composed of employees who are not elected to office
(Habegger, 2010, 197). Theoretically, it is unfeasible to impose any degree of representative
accountability to hold employees accountable. This suggests that states have little degree of
contestability over the decisions of institutions with the exception of appointments.
Consequently, hegemony may be undercut
Neo-Imperialism and the World Systems Theory: A Marxist Approach Against Liberal Institutionalism
Post-Marxist critiques of institutionalism suggest that the exchanges between the global
North and South are driven by inequality-seeking economics for the benefit of hegemony.
Barrnett and Duval (2005) contend global governance renders IO’s as apparatuses to achieve
positive-sum outcomes for compliant states (pg. 57). Focus on positive-sum aspirations
however overlooks the interplay of institutional power and suggests that it leads to “pareto-
superior outcomes” resulting in winner and loser states (pg. 52). For John Ikenberry, this
division rejects the delegation of power to the international community, rather diffusing it in
institutions that promote the outcomes of winner states (pg. 59). The concept of a “loser
state” also contradicts the liberal norms of self-determination if loans and credit by the IMF
can be deliberately withheld punitively. This rejects Keohane’s assertion that domestic states
of the South are sovereign from external (liberal) influence and are capable of self-
determination. Consequently, Barrnett and Duval conclude the United States as an “informal”
empire of agenda-setting institutional power that “primes” it as the only benefactor with the
capacity to enforce norms (compulsorily) due to institutional global outreach (pg. 64).
Whereas Immanuel Wallerstein characterises the exchanges between North and South as
unequal and occurring between “core and periphery” states (Petras, 1981, 148). He argues
that the developed financial cores depend upon extraction from the periphery (pg. 151).
Neoliberalism therefore incorporates a structure of neo-colonialism whereby subordinate
periphery states depend upon foreign capital under a “single capitalist order.” Robert Cox
(1981) expands this, critiquing institutional power of IO’s as an enabler for dependency
through the socialisation of negative norms advertised positively. This is significant for
constructivists as social forces influence the behaviours and identities of actors (pg. 136 and
140). Development aid and loans can therefore be construed as behaviour influencing
positive norms with negative consequences. INGOs and NGOs are thus contributorily
negligent in pursuing inequality as structural adjustment for instance, may be socialised
without consideration of run-off consequences capable of provoking disorder or economic
decline as observed in Bangladesh.
Conclusion
At the heart of this analysis is the placement of liberal institutionalism subject to the political
authority of hegemony. From the outset, the connection between IOs and hegemony suggests
that conflicts of interest will negatively influence institutional power wielded by INGOs and
implicate peace. Likewise, institutionalism maximises the role of superpowers, rendering
peace as subjective if the rules of the game can be bent in favour of the hegemon. On the
other hand, it would be a mistake to discount its cooperative deliberative and peace-making
function of IOs and INGOs and their socialisation capacities, however this is not without
internal issues implicating hegemonic stability and order. Finally, critical approaches suggest
that neoliberal institutionalism imposes more harm than good through inequality-inducing
norms in the global South. Although liberal institutionalism mitigates anarchy through
cooperation enforcement, its jurisdiction remains inferior to hegemony. Ultimately,
international institutions comply to a large extent with the United States as the rules of the
game have been predetermined to aggressively diffuse political, social and economic values
driven by neoliberalism as universalist norms on all actors including the predetermination of
peace.
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Jasper Wiggins
27/08/2024
The Social Contract captures the relationship between consent to govern by the individual, and the extent to which the State exercises authority. Both Kant and Locke examine conditional express and tacit consent and how it compares with obliged moral duty. Kant's view towards the role of the State differs from Locke's notion that authority to establish a society is granted by the consent of the majority, rather than constitution. Ultimately, Kant's morally regulative approach challenges Locke, asserting that the empowerment of constitution requires the incorporation of popular obedience, to uphold enforceable legal authority.
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Explore More on Ideology
International and intergovernmental organisations have enshrined to liberalism as a
universalist economic and political doctrine; however, this is not without internal issues. For
John and Francis Orneal (1996), economic interdependence has facilitated a peace between
trading partner states, realising Kant’s “peace of nations.” In this sense, business can be
considered more profitable than war (pg. 13). Indeed, global forums and transnational actors
like the Association of Southeast Asian Partners facilitate coordination between economic
actors through multilateral dialogue and provide a space to resolve differences while fostering
mutual interdependence. Liberal universalism has thus demonstrated a constructive effect in
peace-making as hot wars since 1991 have been relatively localised at the expense of
unipolarity (Imperial War Museums, 2024). Whereas normative values of liberalism have
been socialised by IO’s to the extent that they have been insulated from abrogation in
domestic legislatures of states. Their promotion as social imperatives by IGOs and NGOs
underscore that IO’s contribute significantly to their safekeeping and assure continuity in the
long-term for coordination (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, 15-16). For example, after Trump’s
presidency, Biden rejoined the Paris Accords, signifying an advance back into the
international.
On the contrary, Barrnett and Fennimore’s classification of the pathologies of international
organisations considers the role NGOs internally as limited in implementing norms.
According to Robert Keohane’s observations, IO’s socialise norms not because they “are
strong” and have the jurisdiction, but because they lack it (Barrnett and Fennimore, 1999, pg.
717). This explains why NGOs depend on charity, although INGO’s differ. States remain
central to the equation for the latter, relying on the legal domestic authority of states to fund
policy. If financing is requisite for agenda, then INGOs will prioritise it like any other
corporation. Critiquing Keohane, John Mearsheimer (1994) argues that liberal institutions
maximise collective good, thereby raising the cost of realist state self-help with sanctions (pg.
24 and 27). If Mearsheimer is correct, then policy guided by liberal institutionalism will
result in conflict in order to have its way. Naomi Klehin (2007) reinforces this, citing that
“shock doctrine” by the US in post-Soviet states including Russia, instigated economic crisis
after the IMF refused to honour debt afforded after dissolution in 1991 (pg. 219). Klehin
attributes hostile “disaster capitalism” to the consolidation of unipolarity by inhibiting
Russia’s economic recovery, indicative of zero-sum behaviour.
Finally, critics of Hegemonic Stability Theory allege that international organisations
contribute to hegemonic decline. This is because, unlike national governments, INGOs and
NGOs are undemocratic bureaucracies composed of employees who are not elected to office
(Habegger, 2010, 197). Theoretically, it is unfeasible to impose any degree of representative
accountability to hold employees accountable. This suggests that states have little degree of
contestability over the decisions of institutions with the exception of appointments.
Consequently, hegemony may be undercut
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