Two-Party V Multi-Party Systems: A Comparative Study
Politics as a system of incentives for power suggests victory is the objective for parties and
critical in their capacity for re-election. Electoral model is thus significant because incumbent
parties selectively implement changes that influence voting behaviour
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Image: Prabook, Stein Rokkan
Introduction
Australian Political Analysis Review - Open Source Independent Education
Politics as a system of incentives for power suggests victory is the objective for parties and
critical in their capacity for re-election. Electoral model is thus significant because incumbent
parties selectively implement changes that influence voting behaviour, driven by the need to
increase their chances of winning elections. On the other hand, some nations switch to a
proportional representation system to accommodate economic climates influencing political
stability. Although political stability is spearheaded through electoral changes that facilitate
more trade to benefit economic climate, the rules of the game are always determined by the
incumbent who may configure the law to perform in future elections.
Electoral System as Election-Winning Strategies on Voting Behaviour and
Characteristic of Model Selection
Electoral model selection is significant as it can determine the competitiveness of the
incumbent over emerging contenders. Carles Boix considers the application of higher
electoral laws in the proportional representation model. For Carles Boix, proportional
representative (PR) models represent the consequences of strategic voting orchestrated by
elites. Higher electoral laws thereby reflected an incumbent party’s calibration of
proportionality to best fit their interests. This furthers Stein Rokkan’s hypothesis on electoral
selectivity. For Rokkan, PR in France limited the emergence of the left in the legislature as
candidacy was reduced to strategic coordination particularly in 1968. This behaviour is
reflective in France’s oscillation between majoritarian and PR systems, characterising it as
one of the most disproportionately representative and systems.
Similarly, Duverger’s Law perpetuates that while plurality often leads to multi-party systems,
two-party dominance works complementarily to exclude smaller contenders in their tenure.
For Anthony Downs, social cleavages represent the ideological grievance against parties.
These implications assume a twofold mechanical (first by the post magnitude) and
psychological (minority disempowerment) effect, characterising parties as either election-
winning or influencing. While election-winning parties may win in plurality, they become
similar over time until multi-party systems arise to indemnify polarisation. New models are
essentially preferable for election-winning parties when their old model no longer benefits
their electoral needs.
Electoral Model Conducive to Political Stability and Trade
For Arend Lijiphart, the significance of the PR model on district magnitude measures a
nation’s stability. In this sense, political stability is a dynamic and relative to changes.
Lijiphart notes that as “district magnitude increases, proportionality decreases.” This is
reflected in France’s electoral history as Lijiphart ranks France amongst the lowest in
Europe. While Lijiphart problematises Rokkan in his attribution of change to the Socialist
threat in 1968, juxtaposition with the rest of Western Europe suggests that PR that is more
indicative to civil peace, with magnitude in Germany and the Netherlands ranking
consistently the highest. Rogowski concludes that the outcome PR state can rely on trade
dependence as it insulates itself from protectionism, often attributed to short-term diplomatic
grievances. This can be viable as economic relations with other nations can remain constant
due to assurances of multi-party commitment.
Conclusion
At the heart of this argument resides electoral changes as a product of incumbent-engineered
voting behaviour and desire for political stability. Electoral reform is characteristic between
shifts to PR systems and continued plurality depending on election-winning prospects of the
incumbent. Selective changes are conducive to trade if economic climate posits less-radical
cooperative outcomes with the PR model. Ultimately, electoral systems incentivise
competition as a zero-sum game whereby the incumbent determines its rules.
Bibliography
Boix, Carles. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced
Democracies.” American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (1999): 609–24.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2585577.
Downs, A. “The Statics and Dynamics of Party Ideologies” in An Economic Theory of
Democracy. 1957 Harper, New York.
Lijphart, Arend. “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85.” American
Political Science Review 84, no. 2 (1990): 481–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963530.
Farrel, DM. “The Political Consequences of Electoral Systems” in Comparing Electoral
Systems. Macmillan Press. 1998.
Jasper Wiggins
05/04/2024
The Social Contract captures the relationship between consent to govern by the individual, and the extent to which the State exercises authority. Both Kant and Locke examine conditional express and tacit consent and how it compares with obliged moral duty. Kant's view towards the role of the State differs from Locke's notion that authority to establish a society is granted by the consent of the majority, rather than constitution. Ultimately, Kant's morally regulative approach challenges Locke, asserting that the empowerment of constitution requires the incorporation of popular obedience, to uphold enforceable legal authority.
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Article by Jasper Wiggins
Article by Jasper Wiggins
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