To some extent, China can already be described as a participant in economic exchanges with the West. China for example participates in the World Trade Organisation and has filed complaints against the European Union’s imposition of tariffs against electric vehicles. China’s response to the EU underscores an identity crisis incurred by many Western countries: to what extent does our commitment to free-trade and multilateralism discount national sovereignty and our domestic unemployment rates. If the EU cannot locate a middle ground, then it is reasonable to conclude that, contra-neoliberal assessment, recognition of domestic economic performance as a greater priority than that of the international. Already, China has experienced a consequence of balancing economic international interdependence in the political economy with domestic monetary policy.

Unipolarity under the United States poses another point of grievance particularly if China can be concluded in wanting to maximise its economic predominance in South Asia. Geo-political contradictions between the US’s aspiration to safeguard Taiwan would invalidate healthy competition unless resolved prior to bilateral agreement. Trump’s trade war, noticeably continued by the Biden administration, does upon face value, discount most prospects for reconciliation. Indeed, Ikenberry considered the potential for a multipolar world order as compromising the health of the LIO, and by extension, multilateralist norms and peace. The reality is less forgiving for the LIO when China and Russia’s military and economic partnership is scrutinised by critical neo-realist John Mearsheimer who argues amity between the two are a direct result of US provocation. Neoliberals however refute this, arguing unipolarity as core to the liberal peace since the collapse of the USSR and therefore, essential to taming what Kenneth Waltz described as ‘anarchy’ without hegemonic determination.

Nonetheless, recent assessments by economists consider the potency of the combined authoritarian market capitalist model. According to Stefan Halper, China has determined that the entrenchment of a liberal capitalist system of government is antithetical to its economic predominance. Struggle for power, even in a two-party parliamentary setting, is thought to be compromising of long-term economic agenda according to Beijing. Both credit-rating institutions and the Chinese Government have forecasted a positive bond curve of at least 2.1% extending well beyond 2050. This suggests net-positive currency and economic growth in the long term. While this cannot entirely be attributed to authoritarian adjudication of monetary policy in China, a single consensus by the Chinese Communist Party implies that long-term assurances to investors can be tamed by one-party rule.